Leveraged Buyouts: The Predictive Power of Target Firm Characteristics by Jiang, Yutao (James)
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship
2019
Leveraged Buyouts: The Predictive Power of Target
Firm Characteristics
Yutao ( James) Jiang
Claremont McKenna College
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jiang, Yutao ( James), "Leveraged Buyouts: The Predictive Power of Target Firm Characteristics" (2019). CMC Senior Theses. 2059.
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/2059
  
 
 
Claremont McKenna College 
 
Leveraged Buyouts: The Predictive Power of Target Firm Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to  
Professor George Batta 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Yutao (James) Jiang 
 
 
 
 
for 
Senior Thesis 
Fall 2018 
December 10, 2018
   
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
There are many people whom I would like to thank for their help in writing this thesis. First and 
foremost, I am eternally thankful to my parents, Jingzhen Wang and Quanyong Jiang, for their 
unwavering support throughout my four years at Claremont McKenna College, and in the past 
twenty-one years. If not for them, I could never have been where I am today.  
 
Secondly, I would like to thank Professor George Batta, D.B.A. and Professor Heather Antecol, 
Ph.D. for their guidance and invaluable advice along the process. I could not have navigated this 
journey without their expertise. In addition, I want to extend my appreciation to my advisor and 
mentor, Professor Eric Helland, Ph.D., as well as all faculty members of the Robert Day School 
of Economics and Finance. I am especially grateful for the mentorship that Professor Helland 
offered during my struggling first semester at Claremont and his continued support afterwards. 
He and other faculties introduced me to the field of Financial Economics and equipped me with 
the knowledge and skills necessary for this thesis, for which I am deeply thankful.  
 
Finally, I want to thank all my friends at Claremont for making the past four years the best part 
of my life. To Joshua Shen, John Xia, and Andy Ye, thank you for giving me countless moments 
of joy and laughter, as well as your unreserved help and support in all my endeavors. To my 
friends in classes and the Student Investment Fund, I am grateful for all the thought-provoking 
discussions that have made my CMC experience complete. 
 
 
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 1 
I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 
II. Literature Review ....................................................................................................................... 3 
III. Data ........................................................................................................................................... 6 
IV. Empirical Strategy and Results ............................................................................................... 13 
V. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 21 
Appendices .................................................................................................................................... 24 
References ..................................................................................................................................... 35 
 
  
1 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper utilizes a hazard model to predict the probability of leveraged buyout 
transactions for public firms. Rather than testing specific hypotheses, this paper 
incorporates all plausible predictors identified in existing literature to better delineate the 
effects of different characteristics. Largely confirming past results, I find that LBO 
transactions are more likely to occur for companies with more stable cash flows, less 
market visibility, lower market valuation, lower ownership concentration and lower costs 
of financial distress. By including LBO transactions from 1980 to September 2018, I find 
preliminary evidence that since the financial crisis of 2008 – 2009, private equity firms 
have modified their selection criteria when sourcing LBO deal targets. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This year is shaping up to be the most active year in leveraged buyouts (LBOs) activity 
since the Great Financial Crisis (hereafter GFC), with the dollar volume of LBOs surging 44 
percent year-on-year to $156 billion as of June 11.1 It now appears that LBOs are back with full 
force from their dormant years since the GFC. While private equity (PE) takeovers and LBOs are 
not new to the financial markets and academia, it is worth re-visiting the motives behind such 
transactions in light of the GFC ten years ago. Perhaps surprisingly, not much attention has been 
devoted to more recent LBO transactions, with most studies focusing on deals prior to 2008 
(Renneboog and Vansteenkiste (2017)).  
The existing empirical literature in the United States focuses largely on the reasons 
behind companies undertaking LBOs. In particular, LBOs help alleviate the agency problems of 
the target company’s management, through a combination of incentive realignment, more 
corporate control in the hands of PE sponsors, and debt-induced disciplines in free cash flow 
(FCF) distribution (see for example, Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) and Bharath and Dittmar 
(2010), and references therein). Evidence in the literature also suggests that companies are more 
                                                          
1 Gottfried, Miriam, 2018, “LBO Volume Surges as KKR, Others Put $1 Trillion Cash Pile to Work”, The Wall 
Street Journal. 
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likely to go through a LBO if the stock is undervalued or under-performing relative to its peers 
(see for example, Kieschnick (1989) and Billett, Jiang, and Lie (2009)). While there are studies 
investigating factors other than those theorized by the aforementioned main hypotheses 
(Renneboog and Vansteenkiste (2017)), the existing empirical literature generally has not 
attempted to incorporate all these factors into a single prediction model, which may potentially 
give rise to omitted variable biases. While it is important to examine the reasons behind private 
equity takeovers, the ability to make reasonable predictions of public-to-private (PTP) 
transactions has significant real-life implications in stock trading, corporate takeover defense, as 
well as mergers and acquisitions (M&A). 
The purpose of this paper is to extend the existing literature by constructing a prediction 
model that incorporates all the plausible predictors from existing literature. Moreover, I extend 
the analysis period by examining transactions from 1980 to September 2018. Specifically, using 
the Thomson Reuters Eikon database, I first identify over 14,500 LBOs or PE-sponsored 
transactions during this time period. For those publicly traded target companies with sufficient 
data available, I then collect information on their company stock and financials to construct the 
predictor variables. Further, I obtain the same set of information for all other publicly traded 
companies during the same time period to serve as the comparison group of the LBO targets.  
Using a hazard model to predict the probability of a firm being targeted for LBO by PE 
funds, I find that LBOs are more likely to take place for companies with more stable free cash 
flows, lower market-to-book ratio, lower pre-LBO ownership concentration, higher R&D 
expenses and less growth in analyst coverage. My empirical findings largely confirm the 
conventional theories that LBO target companies tend to experience poor growth and stock 
returns, and generate stable levels of free cash flow. In addition, my results provide more 
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evidence for the market visibility theory first explored by Mehran and Peristiani (2010) and 
Bharath and Dittmar (2010), which states that LBO targets generally suffer from lack of market 
attention and coverage. Finally, by examining the 10-year sub-periods that preceded and 
followed the GFC, I find that during market booms, private equity firms seem to exhibit a higher 
risk appetite in selecting LBO targets with less stable levels of cash flows. This preliminary 
finding is consistent with the conventional wisdom that PE firms tend to tolerate higher risks in 
their investments in pursuit of returns in excess of the bullish equity market.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section II reviews the existing 
empirical literature and provides some insights into potential predictors of PE takeovers. Section 
III describes the construction of the data set. Section IV presents the empirical model and 
discusses the results. Section V concludes with suggestions for future work.   
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
During the first wave of LBO booms in the 1980s, Maupin, Bidwell and Ortegren (1984) 
are among the first to examine the pre-existing characteristics of public companies that undergo 
private buyouts. The authors specifically investigate management buyout (MBO) transactions 
and compare the taken-private companies and their public counterparts. They find companies 
that go through MBOs tend to have higher pre-transaction managerial stock ownership, higher 
and more stable cash flows, lower price-to-book ratios, and higher dividend yields than their 
peers that remain public. Subsequent studies by Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Kieschnick (1989) 
produced mixed results regarding Maupin, Bidwell and Ortegren’s (1984) conclusion on higher 
cash flows and lower price-to-book ratios for LBO firms. Despite the inconclusiveness of these 
studies, they offer valuable insights on potential determinants of LBO transactions. 
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Since the earlier studies that use data from the 1980s, there has been a plethora of studies 
on the rationales behind LBOs using more recent data up to and including 2007. However, most 
of the studies focus on the sources of wealth gains from companies going private (see 
Renneboog and Vansteenkiste (2017) for a more detailed review). This literature is underpinned 
by a list of hypotheses that try to explain companies’ going-private decision, including but not 
limited to: incentive realignment, free cash flow, corporate control, and undervaluation2.  
According to Renneboog and Vansteenkiste (2017), the incentive realignment hypothesis 
states that by increasing managerial ownership in the company during a LBO, shareholders can 
align the management’s incentives for better performance post-LBO. Kaplan and Stromberg 
(2009) find support for the incentive realignment hypothesis from a median 16% increase in 
management equity ownership after LBOs. However, Halpern, Kieschnick and Rotenberg (1999) 
provide evidence that challenges this hypothesis. More specifically, the authors argue that pre-
buyout managerial equity ownership is not a determinant of PTP buyout transactions, since firms 
with both high and low managerial ownership can be taken private via LBO, albeit under 
different processes.  
Mixed evidence has also been found on the free cash flow hypothesis, which states that 
companies with higher and more stable FCF are more likely to go through a LBO because by 
exchanging equity for debt, management will be forced to pay out FCF (Renneboog and 
Vansteenkiste (2017)). While Halpern, Kieschnick and Rotenberg (1999) and Kieschnick (1989) 
fail to corroborate the FCF hypothesis, more recent studies have documented evidence in favor 
of the positive relationship between a firm’s FCF and its probability of going private (Billett, 
Jiang, and Lie (2009) and Bharath and Dittmar (2010)).  
                                                          
2 For a comprehensive list of hypotheses for public-to-private transactions and their underlying theories, please refer 
to Renneboog and Vansteenkiste (2017) 
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More consensus seems to have been reached regarding the control and undervaluation 
hypotheses. The control hypothesis is the idea that PE firms have concentrated ownership in 
post-LBO companies, thus are more incentivized to actively monitor the management. 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice (1984), and Maug (1998) both find evidence supporting this 
theory. The undervaluation hypothesis claims that companies with lower-than-average market 
valuation or stock performance are more likely to become targets of LBOs. Most studies on this 
hypothesis find supporting evidence (Maupin, Bidwell and Ortegren (1984), Kieschnick (1989) 
and Billett, Jiang, and Lie (2009)), while Lehn and Poulsen (1989) casts some doubt on the 
undervaluation hypothesis by challenging the premise that management has an informational 
advantage over the market, especially in the case of MBOs. 
In addition to these hypotheses, some studies have also investigated other factors as 
potential determinants of LBO transactions. For example, using deals from the 1980s, Opler and 
Titman (1993) find strong evidence that the costs of potential financial distress is a deterrent of 
firms undergoing a leveraged transaction to go private. Billett, Jiang, and Lie (2010), on the 
other hand, focus on the change-in-control covenants and its impact on a company’s probability 
of being an LBO target. The authors find that given the protection provided to bondholders, the 
existence of change-in-control covenants reduces the likelihood of a company being targeted in 
LBOs by half. Further, by examining deals up to 2007, Mehran and Peristiani (2010) and 
Bharath and Dittmar (2010) both find supporting evidence that companies are more likely to go 
private via PE-sponsored transactions when they fail to attract enough market attention, as 
measured by analyst coverage growth and institutional ownership. 
This paper attempts to contribute to this topic in a numbers of ways. First, this paper 
examines LBO transactions from 1980 to 2018, which extends beyond the sample period used in 
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most of the existing studies. The current literature mainly examines the first two waves of LBO 
booms: one in the 1980s and one in early 2000s before the GFC. By including more recent LBO 
deals, this paper seeks to add some insights on PE firms’ choices of LBO targets post-GFC. The 
ultra-low interest rate environment since 2008 has allowed PE firms access to cheaper debt 
financing. Lower cost of debt, together with a sustained bull market over the past ten years, 
might have shifted the risk appetite of PE firms in selecting LBO targets. Second, conventional 
wisdom of the buyout market seems to suggest that LBO targets are usually more mature, but 
there has not been much efforts on formally examining the relationship between a company’s age 
(i.e. years in existence) and the probability of an LBO. While this paper does not look to 
rigorously investigate this relationship, it seeks to provide some preliminary evidence on the 
effect of firm age. Third, instead of testing specific hypotheses, this paper includes all plausible 
factors as determinants and constructs a comprehensive prediction model for private equity 
takeovers. To the best of my knowledge, there has been no such attempt in the U.S. literature on 
PTP transactions to date. The inclusion of all plausible predictors better delineates the effects of 
individual factors by alleviating omitted variable bias. Moreover, while it is important to 
understand the rationales behind LBOs, an effective prediction model of PE takeovers would be 
valuable to portfolio managers and investment bankers alike.  
 
III. DATA  
The large number of leverage buyout transactions since 1980 (Figure 1) presents a 
valuable source for investigating the potential predictors of such transactions. I use data from 
Thomson Reuters Eikon to obtain the complete sample past LBO targets. This is the most 
comprehensive data set I can get without access to the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) M&A 
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database. The sample includes all LBO deals targeting companies in the United States, regardless 
of the deal status, from January 1st, 1980 to September 30th, 2018. Any transaction classified as 
“LBO” or “MBO” is included since these are the two most common forms of private equity-
backed leveraged transactions. Since all LBO transactions, completed or not, are included in the 
sample, it should somewhat mitigate the survivorship bias in using only completed transactions. 
This sample selection approach identifies a total of 14,800 targets between 1980 and 2018 (see 
Table 1). As is common with M&A transactions, not all of these deals can be used in the 
analysis because often the targets are private companies with limited information, subsidiaries or 
subdivisions of public companies. Since private companies or subsidiaries usually do not have 
sufficient data available, they are excluded from the analysis. This sample restriction results in a 
total of 1,158 publicly traded LBO targets for the sample period. If the same company – as 
defined by the same Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures (CUSIP) 
identifier – underwent multiple LBOs in different years during this time period, it is treated as 
different targets since the target’s financial status, ownership structure, among others, are usually 
quite different at the time of each LBO transaction.  
Using the CUSIP identifier available from Thomson Reuters Eikon, I obtain the target 
firm’s analyst coverage from Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S), institutional 
ownership from Thomson Reuters’ 13-F filings, stock and trading data from Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP), and financials from Compustat. This list of transactions is further 
reduced due to data availability issues on the target company’s financial and stock information. 
The databases either lack the data past 2017 or mid-2018, or have no records for some target 
companies. In addition to above constraints, I further restrict the sample by eliminating 
companies with minimal revenue (less than 1 million) and minimal total assets (less than 1 
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million) to mitigate the skewness caused by extremely large values of ratios and growth metrics, 
which will be discussed in detail below. I also eliminate companies with negative price-to-book 
ratios since a negative multiple is meaningless in a market valuation comparison. The final 
restricted sample consists of 781 LBO target companies with sufficient data.  
I use an LBO dummy variable to indicate whether a given company in a given year is an 
LBO target. The companies identified during the initial sample selection are assigned a value of 
1 for the years that they undergo LBOs. All the other public companies are coded as 0, which 
include public companies that are never targeted and the target companies before going private.  
Similar to the existing literature (see for example, Opler and Titman (1993) and Bharath 
and Dittmar (2010)), I use the financials data from the Compustat database to construct Free 
Cash Flow to Firm (FCFF), which is calculated by subtracting capital expenditure and the 
change in net working assets from the after-tax EBIT (Earnings before Interest and Taxes) and 
then adding in depreciation and amortization expenses. I then calculate the FCF margin 
(FCFFpct), as a percentage of total revenue of the period, as well as the growth of FCF over prior 
years (FCFF_Grow1, FCFF_Grow2, and FCFF_Grow3). In addition, I also calculate the trailing 
3-year standard deviation of FCFF for the same firm as an indicator of the stability of cash flows 
(FCFFvol). To examine the disciplinary effects induced by high leverage in LBOs (see 
Renneboog and Vansteenkiste (2017) and references therein), I use the pre-LBO fiscal year’s 
debt-to-asset ratio (DebtAsset) and the EBIT interest coverage ratio (EBITCov) as measures of 
pre-existing leverage. An alternative set of metrics I use for leverage is debt-to-EBITDA 
(Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization) and EBITDA after capital 
expenditure interest coverage (EBITDACov).  
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As suggested by past studies (see for example, Weir, Laing and Wright (2005) and the 
references therein), companies that choose to undergo LBOs tend to suffer from lower-than-
average stock returns or valuations. The company’s management may have an informational 
advantage regarding the valuation of its assets, thus incentivizing the decision to go private. 
Consistent with past research, I use the Price-to-Book Ratio (PtoB) and trailing twelve month 
returns prior to the LBO transaction announcement or rumor (ReturnTTM) as proxies for 
undervaluation of the target companies. In calculating the PtoB variable, I first use the monthly 
stock price data provided by the CRSP, and then divide it by the book value per share, computed 
from the Compustat financials dataset.  
Evidence has also been found that PE firms are more incentivized to actively monitor the 
post-buyout management due to the concentrated ownership (see for example, Maupin, Bidwell 
and Ortegren (1984)). In comparison, it may not be cost-effective enough for large institutional 
owners of public companies to actively monitor their holdings (see for example, DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Rice (1984), and Maug (1998)). To investigate the predictive power of the pre-
LBO ownership structure, I use the Herfindahl – Hirschman Index of ownership concentration 
(AvgOwnConc), provided by Thomson Reuters Stock Ownership database. A higher 
AvgOwnConc number indicates a higher degree of concentration in the company’s stock 
ownership. 
Recent studies have brought attention to the effects of market visibility in a company’s 
decision to undergo an LBO (Mehran and Peristiani (2010) and Bharath and Dittmar (2010)). I 
follow these two papers in using institutional ownership, analyst coverage growth and share 
turnover as measures for market attention. From Thomson Reuters 13-F filings database, I 
calculate the percentage of outstanding shares owned by institutional investors for a given 
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company (AvgInstPerc). I/B/E/S collects the EPS (Earnings per Share) estimate that analysts 
give to a company for its fiscal year or quarter. To account for the varying degrees of coverage 
between analysts who only give one fiscal year estimate and those who give quarterly estimates, 
I construct the analyst coverage (Coverage) variable by totaling the number of EPS estimates 
given to a company over a calendar year. Thus, an analyst that issues four quarterly EPS 
estimates would represent 4 counts whereas one who issues only the fiscal year estimate would 
represent 1 count. Coverage growth is then calculated for each company over a one- to three- 
year period (CovGrow1, CovGrow2, and CovGrow3). With trading data from the CRSP 
database, the share turnover ratio (ShrTurnOver) is calculated by dividing the average volume 
traded for a stock by the average number of shares outstanding during a given year.  
Opler and Titman (1993) investigate the potential financial distress costs as a deterrent 
for companies choosing a LBO as an exit strategy because of the high leverage, and thus risks, 
involved. In their paper, the authors use research and development (R&D) expenses and the level 
of diversification of a company as proxies for the potential costs of financial distress. Their 
rationale is that companies with more diversified operations are less prone to high costs of 
financial distress because their assets are not concentrated within a certain product line. On the 
other hand, companies with high R&D expenses tend to fall prey to higher financial distress 
costs due to the uniqueness of their product or services offering, as well as the difficulty for 
outsiders to monitor the progress of R&D. In addition, the authors point to the high growth 
nature usually associated with R&D-intensive firms, which does not conform to the conventional 
understanding of good LBO targets. In this paper, I also use the R&D expense as a percentage of 
total revenue to proxy for the potential costs of financial distress (RDpct). However, instead of 
following Opler and Titman (1993) in using the diversification index, I use the percentage of 
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total assets in property, plant, and equipment (PPEpct) as a complementary measure for the 
potential financial distress costs. Since these assets tend to have higher recovery values in 
bankruptcy proceedings, a higher PPEpct should, at least to a certain extent, mitigate the loss of 
value during financial distress.  
Due to limited data availability, the firm’s age in this data set is calculated as the number 
of years that the firm has existed as a public company since its first year of the time series (Age). 
If a company is taken private via an LBO, reemerges as a public company, and then undergoes 
another LBO, it is treated as two distinct companies, thus the Age variable is recalculated for its 
second appearance as a public company. To control for the effect of firm size, I use the CRSP 
stock data to compute the natural log of market capitalization (lnMktCap). The full list of 
predictor variables and corresponding definitions is provided in Table 2.  
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the main variables of interest by LBO status. 
Consistent with my expectation and traditional perception, companies that undergo LBOs have 
significantly higher and more stable levels of free cash flows. Also, LBO targets on average 
experience a trailing twelve month return that is about 4% lower than their public counterparts. 
Regarding market valuation, LBO target companies’ average price-to-book (P/B) ratio is 1.94, 
which is about 24.7% lower than the 2.42 P/B ratio of their public counterparts. In addition, the 
LBO companies suffer from a statistically significant 2.1 percentage point differential in revenue 
growth as compared to non LBO target public companies. The three measurements together 
reaffirm the perception that buyout firms tend to target struggling companies, hoping to turn 
them around with restructured operations. Moreover, LBO target companies on average spend 
only 1.2% of their revenue on R&D whereas the comparison group spends an average of 2.1%. 
The statistically significant difference is consistent with the findings of Opler and Titman (1993).  
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The statistics on market visibility are, however, less clear. LBO targets on average see a 
13.1% decline in analyst coverage over the one year period before going private, while other 
public companies experience an average 16.3% growth. Trading volume also seems to suggest a 
lack of market attention, with LBO company shares turning over about 6% less than the public 
group on average. Nonetheless, LBO companies do have a slightly higher institutional ownership 
than other public peers, which should supposedly bring more market attention.  
Perhaps also surprising is the difference in firm age between the two groups. As 
discussed above, PE takeover targets are usually thought to be more mature. Nonetheless, the 
average age of LBO targets is about 12 years while the comparison group is almost 14 years old 
on average. Since companies that undergo multiple LBOs tend to stay public for a shorter period 
of time in between two LBOs, I then exclude such firms to eliminate the downward skewness 
caused by them. Yet, the LBO target group is still significantly younger than the comparison 
group by about 1.3 years. This might potentially be a sign of survivorship bias of some kind. As 
mentioned above, the companies that choose to LBO are most likely struggling and experiencing 
below-average stock returns while healthy and financially robust companies tend to stay public 
for a longer time. The same is found with respect to the difference in the average market value 
between the two groups of companies. LBO companies are roughly $250 million smaller as 
measured by market capitalization (MktCap), which could be a result of poor growth and 
mismanagement as compared to their longer-lasting public counterparts. However, this may also 
hint at the limited financing capacity of the PE sponsors. Given the high leverage used in typical 
LBO transactions, it is arguably easier to takeover smaller targets, although mega-deals (target 
MktCap greater than $10 billion) do happen from time to time. The largest LBO target on file is 
a rumored takeover of Home Depot in 2006, when its market value was about $86 billion. 
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The remainder of the paper formally analyzes the determinants of a company’s likelihood 
of being targeted in an LBO transaction. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND RESULTS 
To examine how changes in specific firm characteristics impact the probability of going 
private, I use a hazard model to predict the probability of a LBO for a given company in any 
given year during its public life. More specifically, I employ a logit model, which is commonly 
used to predict rare events, to investigate the predictive power of different firm characteristics on 
LBO transactions. Controlling for the fact that a company may be in public existence for a few 
years and go private at a later date, I treat each firm-year combination as a unique observation. 
The Age variable is then used to differentiate the different years of data for the same company. 
This allows the model to specifically account for the changing probability of LBO over time. As 
pointed out by Shumway (2001), the hazard model allows one to take time-varying covariates 
into consideration. This ability to control for changing company characteristics is important to 
my prediction model because certain characteristics may have changed over the years before a 
public company becomes an LBO target, (e.g. declining growth and market attention, poor 
public market returns, etc.). As a result, the hazard model allows me to simultaneously examine 
the difference in characteristics both across companies, as well as over time for the same 
company. Another advantage of the hazard model is that the inclusion of the Age variable 
delineates its effect, since as theorized above, a firm’s age – as a measure of company maturity – 
could be a predictor of LBOs. 
The model to be estimated is given by: 
𝐿(𝑡𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖,𝑡) = 𝐿(𝑡𝑖, 0) + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     (1)  
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where 𝐿(𝑡𝑖, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡) is the log likelihood of company i undertaking an LBO at time t, given the time-
varying covariates 𝑋𝑖,𝑡, which is a matrix of independent predictors used in the model. 𝐿(𝑡𝑖, 0) is 
the baseline log likelihood of company undertaking an LBO, without any information about its 
characteristics, while 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. This model estimates the matrix of coefficients, 𝛽, 
which presents the effect of each independent variable on the predicted LBO probability. A 
positive coefficient on an independent variable x suggests that the probability of LBO increases 
with the value of x, whereas 𝑒𝑥 reveals how much the probability would change for every one 
unit increase in the value of x, holding all other independent variables at their respective means. 
Table 4 presents the regression results of the hazard model specified above. Overall, the 
results are similar across specifications tested. LBOs are more likely to happen for companies 
with more stable free cash flows, lower market-to-book ratio, lower pre-LBO ownership 
concentration, higher R&D expenses and less growth in analyst coverage. These findings largely 
confirm the consensus in existing literature regarding free cash flow, undervaluation, control, 
costs of financial distress and market visibility hypotheses (see Renneboog and Vansteenkiste 
(2017) and references therein). However, size itself does not seem to significantly predict the 
likelihood of an LBO. While it is a significant predictor in a few specifications, size loses its 
statistical significance once institutional ownership and ownership concentration are added in as 
separate predictors. Given the high correlations of market capitalization and these two variables 
(0.6082 with institutional ownership, and -0.6646 with ownership concentration), it appears that 
firm size simply picks up the effects of the other two variables.   
Across all specifications tested, firm age is a consistently significant negative predictor of 
LBO probability. This differs from the intuition that LBO targets tend to be more mature (i.e. a 
longer period in existence). However, as elaborated above, this could be a result of survivorship 
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bias in the comparison group, which includes all other public companies over the sample period. 
Since healthier and more financially outstanding companies tend to perform better in the 
markets, they naturally stay public longer than those that decide to go private via LBOs.  
Contrary to some past studies (see for example, Opler and Titman (1993) and Mehran 
and Peristiani (2010)), it is the stability of free cash flows, instead of cash flow levels, that 
matters more in predicting LBO transactions. While counterintuitive at first, this result is more 
understandable when combined with companies’ debt loads pre-LBO, as measured by debt-to-
asset ratio. It appears that PE firms have a particular penchant for companies that already carry a 
relatively high debt load, which seems to suggest a larger debt capacity. In carrying out an LBO 
transaction for these targets, the PE sponsors are more concerned with the debt-servicing ability 
year on year, as opposed to the long term solvency of the target firm. 
Table 5 presents the marginal effects on the probabilities of LBO transactions for a 1 
standard deviation increase in each of the independent variables, holding all the other predictors 
at their respective means. I specifically examine Model (6) of Table 4 because this specification 
is the most comprehensive of all. I deem it important to investigate the economic significance of 
these variables. At the 5% level, six explanatory variables are statistically significant negative 
predictors of the LBO probability: natural log of firm age, analyst coverage growth, ownership 
concentration, P/B ratio, R&D expense, and free cash flow volatility. Among these predictors, 
analyst coverage growth carries the highest impact on the LBO probabilities, with a one standard 
deviation increase in coverage growth resulting in a 0.85 percentage point decline in the LBO 
probability. This comes as a bit of a surprise since its economic significance exceeds those of 
traditional LBO determinants, such as the cash flow level. This finding suggests that PE firms 
are particularly good at sourcing targets that are flying under the radar of the investing public, 
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which could potentially explain the outsized returns generated by private equity funds. However, 
this particular result is somewhat contradicted by institutional ownership percentage, which 
increases the likelihood of a LBO by 0.13 percentage point for a one-standard deviation increase 
at the mean. Mehran and Peristiani (2010) suggests that more analyst coverage and higher 
institutional ownership should both bring about more market visibility, but my results seem to 
confirm the effects of only the former. However, it should be noted that, in terms of measuring 
market visibility, analyst coverage is likely to be a better metric than institutional ownership. It 
may not always be the case that higher institutional ownership would bring more market 
attention to a company, but a larger degree of coverage by research analysts is more likely to 
help a company gain traction among the investing public. 
Another interesting finding from the marginal effects analysis is the importance of R&D 
expenses in PE firms’ LBO decisions. If a company’s R&D expense as a percentage of total 
revenue is increased by one standard deviation (about 3.6 percent), the likelihood of this very 
company undergoing an LBO is reduced by 0.21 percentage point. This confirms Opler and 
Titman (1993) results that high potential costs of financial distress are a significant deterrent of 
the LBO decision. Granted, this result rests on the assumption that the R&D expense level is a 
good proxy for the potential costs of financial distress.  
In addition, price-to-book ratio and free cash flow volatility both exhibit relatively 
significant impacts, with a one standard deviation increase in each lowering the LBO likelihood 
by 0.19 and 0.18 percentage point, respectively. These results largely confirm the conventional 
beliefs and consensus in past studies (see for example Weir, Laing and Wright (2005), Maupin, 
Bidwell and Ortegren (1984) and references therein) that companies targeted in LBO 
transactions tend to have lower market valuation and more stable cash flows.  
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Table 6 reports the regression results for two specifications (Models (5) and (6) in Table 
4) over each of the four ten-year sub-periods in the sample period.3 While a few independent 
variables retain significant predictive power on the LBO probability, most predictors lose their 
significance after 2010. The change in coefficients hints at the changing selection mechanisms 
used by PE firms when sourcing LBO targets.  
Curiously, during the first wave of the LBO boom in the 1980s, the stability of free cash 
flows does not seem to bear much significance for PE firms. It only becomes a statistically 
significant predictor staring in the 1990s. In addition, the years preceding the 2008 GFC see a 
significant increase in LBO volume, largely attributable to the bullish, arguably irrational, 
financial markets. Coinciding with the boom years, LBO targets during this period produce less 
stable free cash flows than before. This could be a sign of elevated risk tolerance by PE sponsors 
in pursuit of investment opportunities. Therefore, they become more willing to take on positions 
in companies with below-optimal levels of cash flow stability. The same phenomenon is present 
for the most recent sub-period from 2010 to September 2018. Perhaps not so surprisingly, 
prolonged quantitative easing from multiple central banks during the past ten years of economic 
recovery provides an ultra-low interest rate environment. As a result, the cheap debt financing 
has arguably allowed PE sponsors to materialize these riskier investments. 
The sub-period robustness tests produce mixed evidence regarding the market visibility 
hypothesis proposed and investigated by Mehran and Peristiani (2010) and Bharath and Dittmar 
(2010). Robust across all sub-periods, analyst coverage growth is a negative predictor of LBO 
probability. While a significantly negative predictor for the entire sample period, pre-LBO 
ownership concentration ceases to be a significant factor in the predicting model after the 1980s. 
                                                          
3 I only include data up until September 30, 2018 for Panel D. 
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This suggests that the potential value creation from PE firms’ active monitoring as a 
concentrated shareholder has diminished over time. Although beyond the scope of this paper, 
financial regulations (e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley Act) that enhance disclosure requirements for public 
companies might be a relevant factor in the fading impact of concentrated ownership. 
Interestingly enough, however, the positive coefficient for percentage owned by institutional 
shareholders has experienced a gradual increase over the past four decades. According to the 
market visibility hypothesis (see Mehran and Peristiani (2010) and references therein), higher 
institutional ownership should correspond to higher visibility by investors. Nonetheless, this 
statement is not consistent with the results from analyst coverage growth. Although all firms in 
the sample have experienced a rise in institutional ownership over the past four decades (Table 
7), LBO target companies on average have a higher growth than their public counterparts. It 
seems that PE firms are growing more and more interested in companies that are already held by 
institutional investors but somehow fail to generate enough attention from the sell-side research 
analysts. 
The sub-period tests also reveal a declining deterrent effect of financial distress costs. 
Consistent with Opler and Titman’s (1993) results, companies with higher levels of R&D 
expenses are much less likely to be targeted in LBO transactions during the period 1980 to 2009. 
However, this relationship fails to hold after 2010. Without further investigation, I could only 
offer some conjectures about this result. One possible explanation is that the rise of technology 
companies, most of which spend heavily on R&D4, has attracted attention of not only typical 
equity investors but also that of buyout funds. Table 8 reports the number of LBO targets that 
are classified as Information Technology (IT) companies by the Global Industry Classification 
                                                          
4 S&P Global Market Intelligence Capital IQ 
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(GIC) Standard. It is obvious that IT companies have become more frequent targets of LBO 
transactions: the proportion of IT companies as a percentage of all LBO targets more than 
quadrupled over the last four decades. This result is consistent with perspectives from former and 
current investment professionals, which suggests an industry-wide increase in PE investment in 
IT companies, although they do not conform to the traditional perception of good LBO targets. 
In addition, I simply follow Opler and Titman (1993) in using R&D expense as a proxy for the 
potential costs of financial distress. Although their rationale for such a practice may have been 
reasonable during the time frame of their analysis, it could be the case that the cost of financial 
distress can no longer be accurately measured by R&D expense after 2010. However, this is 
beyond scope of current study and could be an area for future research.  
Overall, the sub-period tests confirm the predictive power of several significant 
predictors, including firm age, analyst coverage growth, and cash flow stability. However, the 
changes in some coefficients since 2010 is worth further investigation.  
Considering the increased use of share repurchases and the possibility of consecutive net 
losses, I conduct a robustness test of my model by including firms with negative book value of 
equity. The inclusion of negative book value companies increases the LBO target sample size by 
57 observations. I create the dummy variable negPtoB, which assigns a value of 1 to firms with 
negative price-to-book ratio and 0 otherwise (price data for all observations is nonnegative). To 
delineate the effects of negative book value of equity on the LBO probabilities, I also create an 
interaction term, xiPtoB, for this newly generated negPtoB dummy and the actual PtoB ratio. 
Table 9 reports the regression results for this robustness test across sub-periods. The inclusion of 
companies with negative book value of equity does not materially change the predictive power of 
any independent variables (including that of price-to-book ratio itself), and the results discussed 
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above still hold. However, a negative book equity value appears to lower the likelihood of a 
LBO, at least when P/B ratio is a statistically significant predictor during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Amongst companies with negative book value, the results seem to suggest that PE firms prefer 
those with higher (i.e. less negative) P/B ratios as LBO targets. Nonetheless, this finding is not 
robust across the specifications tested during the sub-periods.  
The robustness check on negative book value of equity suggests that while PE firms 
generally prefer companies with lower P/B ratios as LBO targets, they generally avoid those with 
negative P/B ratios. This finding is evinced by both the negative coefficient on the negPtoB 
dummy, as well as the limited number of LBO targets (only 57) that exhibit such characteristic. 
Possibly, negative book value companies are in so much distress that PE firms deem them 
incorrigible, as this particular firm characteristic usually arises after multiple years of net losses. 
Finally, to examine the accuracy of my prediction model, I divide the restricted sample 
used in Models (6) of Table 4 into deciles based on the predicted probability of LBO for each 
observation. The number of successful predictions in each decile is reported in Table 10. Out of 
781 actual LBOs estimated in this regression, the predicted probabilities for 528 transactions are 
ranked in the top three deciles of all predictions. The top half of the model’s predicted LBO 
likelihood contains 82.8% of all LBOs that take place in reality. While the model predicts actual 
LBOs with decent accuracy, it is much more challenging to predict ex ante which public 
companies will be targeted, since LBO is a rare event after all. With data and time constraints of 
this thesis, I do not have the opportunity to conduct out-of-sample tests, which should add more 
insights on the accuracy of my prediction model. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
There are two main motivations for this paper. First, there has been a surge in leveraged 
buyout activities in the past two years, surpassing the level last seen before the Great Financial 
Crisis of 2008. Therefore, I deem it worthwhile to revisit this particular type of corporate action. 
Despite the extensive literature on LBO transactions, few studies have examined the 
characteristics of LBOs since 2008. The most recent work by Mehran and Peristiani (2010) 
examines LBO transaction data only up to 2007. In light of the changes in the financial markets 
after the crisis, this paper seeks to offer some preliminary evidence on PE firms’ choices of LBO 
targets post-GFC. The second motivation for this paper is the lack of a model that investigates 
the predictive power of all the determinants simultaneously. Most studies on this topic test 
specific hypotheses, hence particular variables attached, regarding PE firms’ motives for LBO 
transactions ((see Renneboog and Vansteenkiste (2017) and references therein). This gives rise 
to potential omitted variable bias, which this paper seeks to alleviate by its inclusion of all 
plausible predictors with sufficient data.  
This paper employs a hazard model to predict the probabilities of a company being 
targeted for LBO by private equity firms. With LBO data spanning from 1980 to September 
2018, I draw upon the existing literature to incorporate as many plausible predictors as 
practically possible and examine their impacts on the LBO decision.  
Overall, LBO transactions are more likely to occur for companies with more stable free 
cash flows, less growth in analyst coverage, lower market-to-book ratio, lower pre-LBO 
ownership concentration, and higher R&D expenses. These findings are robust across 
specifications and for the three decades before 2010. They largely reaffirm findings in past 
literature on free cash flow, undervaluation, control, costs of financial distress and market 
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visibility hypotheses (see Renneboog and Vansteenkiste (2017) and references therein). 
Particularly, market visibility, as measured by the growth in analyst coverage, appears to be the 
most important determinant of a company’s probability of undergoing an LBO. Firm size, 
however, is not significant in my model, which hints at the omitted variable bias present in some 
of the earlier studies (see for example Billett, Jiang, and Lie (2009) and references therein). 
Specifically, the addition of ownership-related variables renders firm size statistically 
insignificant. It could be the case that firm size simply picks up the effects of these predictors in 
previous studies. 
When examining the economic significance of various predictors, a younger firm with 
lower analyst coverage growth, pre-LBO ownership concentration, market-to-book ratio, 
potential costs of financial distress, and cash flow volatility in general experience a higher 
likelihood of LBO. One caveat that shall be noted regarding my findings is the use of R&D 
expense as a proxy for potential costs of financial distress, which is the same methodology used 
by Opler and Titman (1993). While this practice might have been reasonable at the time of its 
publication, it may not be as accurate today, given the rise of information technology firms. 
Thus, it would be a valuable contribution to the LBO literature if an alternative measure could be 
used for financial distress costs, such as the credit default swap implied recovery rate.  
Some interesting findings emerge from my sub-period test. While confirming the 
robustness of firm age, coverage growth and cash flow stability through time, the test reveals the 
fading significance of market-to-book ratio, pre-LBO debt load, and potential cost of financial 
distress since 2010. This finding offers some preliminary evidence that after the financial crisis 
of 2008 – 2009, there might have been a material change in the selection mechanisms that PE 
firms use when sourcing LBO deal targets.  
23 
 
To examine the accuracy of my prediction model, specifically Model (6) of Table 4, I 
divide the sample into deciles based on the predicted probability of LBO for each firm-year 
combination. Out of 781 actual LBOs estimated in this regression, the predicted probabilities for 
528 transactions are ranked in the top three deciles, while the top half of the model’s predicted 
LBO likelihood contains 82.8% of all LBOs that take place in reality.  
Given the time and data constraints, I do not have the opportunity to conduct out-of-
sample predictions to test the accuracy of my model. A decently accurate ex ante prediction 
model for LBO transactions of public companies bears great significance to both the existing 
LBO literature, as well as the development of a viable trading strategy. Therefore, a worthwhile 
project for future research could be to improve upon my results and test for out-of-sample 
prediction accuracy.  
Finally, as discussed above, future research work on this topic could also delve deeper 
into LBO target selection criteria since 2009, which would be of great value to practitioners in 
the private equity and investment banking industry today. Other research extensions on this topic 
include the relation between market size and ownership-related variables, appropriate 
measurements of potential costs of financial distress, and other plausible predictors of LBO 
probabilities not addressed in this paper. 
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APPENDICES 
Figure 1. LBO Deal Volume  
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Table 1. Number of LBO Transactions, by Decade 
 
* Data for 2018 is only partial (01/01/2018 – 09/30/2018) 
  
Period 
Total LBO 
Transactions 
Public-to-Private 
(PTP) Transactions 
PTP% of Total 
Transactions 
1980-1989 1,968 419 21.29% 
1990-1999 2,351 169 7.19% 
2000-2009 4,240 362 8.54% 
2010-2018* 6,241 208 3.33% 
Total 14,800 1,158 7.82% 
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Table 2. Variable Definitions 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable Name     Definition 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Coverage         Total number of EPS estimates given to this company within a 
calendar year 
CovGrow1          Growth of total number of EPS estimates over T-1 year 
CovGrow2          Growth of total number of EPS estimates over T-2 year 
CovGrow3         Growth of total number of EPS estimates over T-3 year 
AvgOwnConc       Average Institutional Ownership Concentration - Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index 
AvgInstPerc      Average Institutional Ownership, Percentage of Total Shares 
Outstanding 
ShrTurnOver       Share Turnover Ratio over the Year 
ReturnTTM         Net Holding Period Return over Trailing 12 Months 
lnMktCap          Natural log of Mkt Cap. 
DebtAsset         Debt-to-Asset Ratio 
DebtEBITDA        Debt-to-EBITDA Multiple 
EBITCov           EBIT Interest Coverage 
EBITDACov         EBITDA Interest Coverage, Net of CapEx 
RevGrow1          Growth of Total Revenue over T-1 year 
RevGrow2          Growth of Total Revenue over T-2 year 
RevGrow3          Growth of Total Revenue over T-3 year 
PPEpct            Property, Plant and Equipment, Percentage of Total Assets 
TangApct         Tangible Assets (Current Assets + PPE), Percentage of Total 
Assets 
FCFFpct            Free Cash Flow to Firm, Percentage of Total Revenue 
FCFF_Grow1        Growth of FCFF over T-1 year 
FCFF_Grow2        Growth of FCFF over T-2 year 
FCFF_Grow3        Growth of FCFF over T-3 year 
FCFFvol            Standard Deviation of FCFF, Trailing 3Yr 
PtoB    Price-to-Book Ratio 
lnAge    Natural log of Firm Age 
LBO_dummy   1=LBO Target; 0=Otherwise 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for LBO Targets and Non-LBO Target Companies 
 (A)  (B)  (A) – (B) 
 LBO Targets  Non-LBO Targets  Differences 
Variable Mean  Mean  t-stat (z-stat) 
Free Cash Flow 
FCFFpct 
 
0.024 
(0.119) 
  
0.015 
(0.144) 
  
1.93* 
FCFFvol 45.95 
(54.20) 
 58.38 
(63.14) 
 -6.35*** 
DebtAsset 0.268 
(0.169) 
 0.245 
(0.165) 
 3.82*** 
EBITCov 9.16 
(10.60) 
 11.32 
(11.83) 
 -5.64*** 
Undervaluation      
ReturnTTM 0.094 
(0.338) 
 0.135 
(0.357) 
 -3.40*** 
PtoB 1.94 
(1.24) 
 2.42 
(1.50) 
 -10.73*** 
Control 
AvgOwnConc 
 
0.118 
(0.114) 
  
0.116 
(0.112) 
  
0.39 
Market Visibility      
AvgInstPerc 0.498 
(0.251) 
 0.487 
(0.265) 
 1.20 
CovGrow1 -0.131 
(0.416) 
 0.163 
(0.457) 
 -19.61*** 
ShrTurnOver 1.07 
(0.75) 
 1.14 
(0.83) 
 -2.45** 
Costs of Financial Distress      
PPEpct 0.326 
(0.216) 
 0.332 
(0.221) 
 -0.73 
RDpct 0.012 
(0.028) 
 0.021 
(0.036) 
 -8.55*** 
Miscellaneous      
Firm Age 11.97 
(5.43) 
 13.85 
(6.35) 
 -9.59*** 
MktCap 663.3  
(746.3) 
 911.0 
(871.9) 
 -9.19*** 
RevGrow1 0.098 
(0.161) 
 0.119 
(0.175) 
 -3.66*** 
BidInterest 0.044  N/A  N/A 
N =  781  57,505   
This table presents firm characteristics for the LBO target sample (column A) and the non-LBO target 
sample (column B). All variables are winsorized at the 1% level.  
t-stat (z-stat) reports the results of a test of difference in means between the two columns. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Hazard Model Results for Probabilities of LBO Transactions 
LBO_dummy (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
lnAge -0.499*** -0.485*** -0.502*** -0.475*** -0.481*** -0.519*** -0.519*** 
 (-7.931) (-7.685) (-8.015) (-7.591) (-7.647) (-8.389) (-8.385) 
lnMktCap 0.0108 0.0800** 0.168*** 0.0903** 0.180*** 0.0271 0.00634 
 (0.332) (2.146) (4.064) (2.420) (4.279) (0.514) (0.123) 
CovGrow1 -2.313*** -2.353*** -2.326*** -2.355*** -2.331*** -2.356*** -2.350*** 
 (-9.712) (-9.799) (-9.498) (-9.805) (-9.470) (-9.204) (-9.203) 
AvgOwnConc      -1.500** -1.523** 
      (-2.469) (-2.508) 
AvgInstPerc      0.631*** 0.644*** 
      (2.606) (2.731) 
ShrTurnOver      0.0509 0.0554 
      (0.876) (0.954) 
PtoB   -0.205***  -0.183*** -0.163*** -0.160*** 
   (-5.309)  (-4.738) (-3.821) (-3.769) 
ReturnTTM      -0.0459 -0.0350 
      (-0.360) (-0.274) 
DebtAsset     0.633** 0.647* 0.469 
     (2.245) (1.801) (1.341) 
EBITCov      -0.00242 -0.00218 
      (-0.437) (-0.393) 
RevGrow1     0.0916 0.0978 0.0967 
     (0.352) (0.368) (0.364) 
PPEpct      -0.395*  
      (-1.749)  
RDpct    -8.402*** -6.437*** -7.526*** -7.103*** 
    (-5.316) (-3.912) (-4.603) (-4.447) 
FCFFpct     0.191 0.0797 0.0483 
     (0.512) (0.213) (0.132) 
FCFFvol  -0.00316*** -0.00377*** -0.00327*** -0.00437*** -0.00366*** -0.00376*** 
  (-3.691) (-4.195) (-3.798) (-4.648) (-3.527) (-3.619) 
TangApct       -0.451 
       (-1.494) 
Constant -3.154*** -3.431*** -3.435*** -3.375*** -3.650*** -2.751*** -2.371*** 
 (-14.75) (-15.27) (-15.02) (-15.02) (-13.94) (-7.610) (-5.298) 
N =  58,286 58,286 58,286 58,286 58,286 58,286 58,286 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Marginal Effects of One Standard Deviation Increase at Means 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Standard 
Deviation 
dy/dx 
at Means 
Marginal Effects 
(+1 Stdev, in Pct. Pts) 
lnAge 0.562 -0.00411 -0.23 
lnMktCap 1.509 0.00021 0.03 
CovGrow1 0.457 -0.01867 -0.85 
AvgOwnConc 0.112 -0.01189 -0.13 
AvgInstPerc 0.264 0.00500 0.13 
ShrTurnOver 0.832 0.00040 0.03 
PtoB 1.501 -0.00129 -0.19 
ReturnTTM 0.357 -0.00036 -0.01 
DebtAsset 0.165 0.00513 0.08 
EBITCov 11.81 -0.00002 -0.02 
RevGrow1 0.175 0.00077 0.01 
PPEpct 0.221 -0.00313 -0.07 
RDpct 0.036 -0.05963 -0.21 
FCFFpct 0.143 0.00063 0.01 
FCFFvol 63.05 -0.00003 -0.18 
 
 
 
30 
 
Table 6. Hazard Model Results for Probabilities of LBO Transactions, by Decade 
 Panel A: 1980 – 1989  Panel B: 1990 – 1999  Panel C: 2000 – 2009 Panel D: 2010 – 2018 
LBO_dummy (5) (6) (5) (6) (5) (6) (5) (6) 
lnAge 0.0428 0.139 -0.687*** -0.646*** -0.303*** -0.366*** -0.474*** -0.442** 
 (0.227) (0.811) (-5.380) (-4.265) (-2.622) (-3.021) (-3.565) (-2.567) 
lnMktCap 0.157** 0.0672 0.340*** 0.211 0.243*** 0.0423 0.0960 -0.267* 
 (2.560) (0.723) (3.609) (1.574) (3.054) (0.383) (0.907) (-1.820) 
CovGrow1 -1.965*** -2.111*** -2.507*** -3.019*** -2.556*** -2.721*** -4.279*** -5.327*** 
 (-5.483) (-5.631) (-4.655) (-4.329) (-6.146) (-4.852) (-5.385) (-5.178) 
AvgOwnConc  -1.461*  0.678  0.144  0.711 
  (-1.866)  (0.562)  (0.111)  (0.396) 
AvgInstPerc  0.266  1.844***  2.337***  3.063*** 
  (0.516)  (3.017)  (4.634)  (4.692) 
ShrTurnOver  0.946***  0.245  -0.120  0.199 
  (8.214)  (1.460)  (-1.153)  (1.375) 
PtoB -0.248*** -0.259*** -0.280*** -0.257** -0.0941* -0.0335 -0.0230 0.117 
 (-3.538) (-2.820) (-2.866) (-2.110) (-1.805) (-0.458) (-0.376) (1.405) 
ReturnTTM  -0.214  -0.526  0.370  -1.149*** 
  (-0.945)  (-1.630)  (1.551)  (-3.313) 
DebtAsset 0.768* 0.455 1.751*** 3.895*** 0.155 -0.234 0.0642 0.0553 
 (1.693) (0.764) (2.907) (4.509) (0.342) (-0.315) (0.113) (0.0558) 
EBITCov  -0.00881  0.0457***  -0.00698  0.00913 
  (-0.761)  (3.745)  (-0.626)  (0.722) 
RevGrow1 0.147 -0.488 1.162** 0.715 0.298 0.426 -0.0117 -0.570 
 (0.359) (-1.047) (2.329) (1.159) (0.764) (0.865) (-0.0269) (-0.904) 
PPEpct  -1.051***  0.162  -0.0442  -0.957 
  (-2.576)  (0.308)  (-0.101)  (-1.619) 
RDpct -15.62*** -22.19*** -8.090** -7.534* -7.200*** -9.351*** 2.796 0.0658 
 (-4.415) (-5.211) (-2.200) (-1.772) (-3.699) (-2.874) (1.471) (0.0256) 
FCFFpct -0.143 -0.297 0.704 0.237 0.964* 1.883** 1.481*** -0.113 
 (-0.270) (-0.508) (0.823) (0.230) (1.883) (2.205) (3.041) (-0.136) 
FCFFvol 0.000602 -0.000461 -0.0109*** -0.00940** -0.00382*** -0.00215 -0.00362** -0.00114 
 (0.335) (-0.226) (-3.002) (-2.444) (-2.740) (-1.242) (-2.185) (-0.580) 
Constant -4.100*** -3.502*** -4.748*** -6.376*** -4.755*** -4.745*** -4.278*** -4.619*** 
 (-7.985) (-4.938) (-9.461) (-7.174) (-9.513) (-5.826) (-5.469) (-3.465) 
N =  14,987 12,460 22,134 17,119 24,610 17,145 17,556 11,562 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. Change in Average Institutional Ownership 
 
 Average Institutional Ownership 
Period LBO Targets Non-LBO Targets 
1980-1989 34.6% 31.1% 
1990-1999 45.1% 41.4% 
2000-2009 64.8% 57.4% 
2010-2018* 71.5% 65.1% 
* Data for 2018 is only partial (01/01/2018 – 09/30/2018) 
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Table 8. Number of Information Technology (IT) LBO Targets, by Decade 
 
* Data for 2018 is only partial (01/01/2018 – 09/30/2018) 
The table above only includes LBO transactions used in Model (5) and (6) of Table 4, since 
these two specifications are the basis for sub-period test results discussion 
 Model (5) Model (6) 
Period IT Targets 
Total LBO 
Targets 
IT% of 
Total 
IT Targets 
Total LBO 
Targets 
IT% of 
Total 
1980-1989 24 351 6.8% 17 323 5.3% 
1990-1999 20 127 15.7% 15 137 10.9% 
2000-2009 68 284 23.9% 33 214 15.4% 
2010-2018* 53 185 28.6% 30 107 28.0% 
Total 165 947 17.4% 95 781 12.2% 
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Table 9. Hazard Model Results for Probabilities of LBO Transactions (incl. negative book value firms), by Decade  
 Panel A: 1980 – 1989  Panel B: 1990 – 1999  Panel C: 2000 – 2009 Panel D: 2010 – 2018 
LBO_dummy (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
lnAge -0.0671 0.0323 -0.693*** -0.689*** -0.256** -0.351*** -0.448*** -0.426** 
 (-0.384) (0.198) (-5.349) (-4.347) (-2.226) (-2.905) (-3.368) (-2.531) 
lnMktCap 0.103* 0.0164 0.239** 0.147 0.199** -0.0360 0.109 -0.287* 
 (1.649) (0.178) (2.362) (1.070) (2.559) (-0.312) (1.026) (-1.959) 
CovGrow1 -1.963*** -2.117*** -2.515*** -3.111*** -2.559*** -2.766*** -4.295*** -5.329*** 
 (-5.710) (-5.815) (-4.840) (-4.461) (-6.293) (-4.998) (-5.573) (-5.283) 
AvgOwnConc  -1.479*  0.548  0.142  0.532 
  (-1.905)  (0.448)  (0.110)  (0.293) 
AvgInstPerc  0.315  1.900***  2.507***  2.873*** 
  (0.619)  (3.135)  (4.960)  (4.590) 
ShrTurnOver  0.899***  0.270*  -0.119  0.221 
  (7.860)  (1.645)  (-1.185)  (1.559) 
PtoB -0.359*** -0.315*** -0.314*** -0.331** -0.0932 -0.0346 -0.0200 0.0707 
 (-3.919) (-2.821) (-2.800) (-2.399) (-1.622) (-0.456) (-0.305) (0.791) 
negPtoB -1.572** -0.984 -1.188** -2.439*** -0.436 -0.444 -0.426 -1.685 
 (-2.564) (-1.537) (-2.227) (-2.868) (-1.178) (-0.956) (-0.837) (-1.533) 
xiPtoB 1.649* 0.937 1.113 2.513** 0.515 0.385 0.878 1.878 
 (1.938) (1.055) (1.438) (2.135) (0.934) (0.550) (1.178) (1.208) 
ReturnTTM  -0.339  -0.706**  0.273  -1.128*** 
  (-1.460)  (-2.166)  (1.199)  (-3.213) 
DebtAsset 0.598 0.0419 1.506** 3.901*** 0.140 -0.139 0.183 0.394 
 (1.307) (0.0645) (2.529) (4.521) (0.314) (-0.193) (0.338) (0.407) 
EBITCov  -0.0140  0.0441***  -0.00587  0.00968 
  (-1.286)  (3.554)  (-0.535)  (0.768) 
RevGrow1 0.170 -0.312 1.069** 0.617 0.339 0.483 -0.00308 -0.538 
 (0.414) (-0.665) (2.246) (1.025) (0.899) (1.009) (-0.00733) (-0.871) 
PPEpct  -1.050***  0.221  -0.0604  -0.982* 
  (-2.621)  (0.425)  (-0.142)  (-1.691) 
RDpct -16.12*** -22.70*** -9.256** -7.687* -7.417*** -9.174*** 2.728 -0.0405 
 (-4.648) (-5.428) (-2.506) (-1.810) (-3.899) (-2.886) (1.476) (-0.0159) 
FCFFpct -0.192 -0.364 0.595 0.311 1.124** 1.926** 1.562*** -0.219 
 (-0.376) (-0.635) (0.781) (0.308) (2.236) (2.339) (3.258) (-0.270) 
FCFFvol 0.00200 0.000867 -0.00789** -0.00855** -0.00344** -0.00144 -0.00420** -0.00145 
 (1.093) (0.421) (-2.241) (-2.279) (-2.527) (-0.817) (-2.560) (-0.713) 
N = 15,240 12,573 22,889 17,504 25,518 17,604 18,298 11,950 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10. Number of Successful Predictions by Decile 
 
Decile 
Successful 
Predictions 
1 29 
2 27 
3 13 
4 33 
5 30 
6 49 
7 67 
8 85 
9 125 
10 323 
Total  781 
 
Total number of observations for Model (6) in Table 4 is 58,286 
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